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Abstract
European Union (EU) law-making has played a key role in promoting social equity
in the UK through safer working conditions, enhanced rights for workers, and by reducing
environmental pollution. Concerns over its effect on business competitiveness have long been
a major driver of Euroscepticism, underpinning criticism of the EU by influential opinion
formers within British conservatism. The Leave Campaign argued that EU laws damage the UK
economy by imposing unnecessary costs on British business, claiming that EU regulations cost
the UK economy £33.3 billion per year. This paper examines the reliability of, and assumptions
that underpin, aggregated estimates of the costs and benefits of EU-derived regulation, and
considers how the economisation of public policy influences understanding of the social value
of regulation. It brings together the findings of studies that have evaluated the accuracy of the
estimated costs and benefits in formal impact assessments and analyses impact assessments of
EU-derived policy instruments aimed at regulating working conditions. Our findings suggest
that aggregated estimates represent poor guides to understanding the social costs and benefits
of social regulation and highlight the value of discarding impact assessment estimates of costs
and benefits in the context of efforts to shape social policy post-Brexit.
Introduction
Economists typically make a distinction between economic regulation, which is
concerned with prices and entry controls, and social regulation, which governs
other aspects of business activity and plays an important role in protecting the
environment, safeguarding the rights and welfare of workers and consumers, and
generally limiting the ability of companies to externalise costs onto governments
and publics (Breyer, 1998). Incomplete or ineffective regulation can have far-
reaching effects on social equity and government expenditure.One cost-of-illness
study on occupational asthma, for instance, estimated that individuals (49 per
cent) and the state (48 per cent) shouldered 97 per cent of the burden, with just
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3per centbornebyemployers (Ayres et al., 2011). Strong,well-designed regulation,
by contrast, can save lives. To take just one example, in the early 2000s a DEFRA-
commissioned study projected that air quality policies introduced between 1990
and 2001 affecting transport and electricity generation would reduce premature
deaths by 6,857, and save between 81,601 to 244,803 life years, in 2010 alone
(Watkiss et al., 2004).
Despite representing an important protective buffer between unchecked
economic activity and public well-being, claims that social regulation (hereafter
regulation) negatively affects competitiveness, firm performance, output, and
employment have come to dominate the public conversation on regulatory
policy in the UK. Focusing initially on domestic regulation, these claims have
progressively coalesced around European-Union-derived regulation, reflecting
successive amendments to the Treaty of Rome, which have radically expanded
European Union (EU) influence in UK policymaking (Miller, 2010, 2015). The
EU’s partial annexation of UK policy-making, and its alleged effects on business
competitiveness, continued to drive British conservatism’s antagonism towards
the European project throughout the 2000s (Cash and Jamieson, 2004; Congdon,
2014; Economic Competitiveness Policy Group, 2007; Heath, 2016; Milne, 2004),
and represented a key plank of Vote Leave’s case for leaving the EU (Treasury
Committee, 2016) despite theEuropeanCommission’s best efforts tobringpolicy-
making more closely into line with business interests (Smith et al., 2014).
Anti-regulatory sentiment derived support from both survey findings
of business actors (Baldock and Blundel, 2014; National Audit Office and
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2014), and thematic reports
(Federation of Small Businesses, 2011) and lobbying (Federation of Small
Businesses, 2013) by UK business associations. On the face of it, these appeared to
confirm studies highlighting the negative impact of regulation on firm growth,
and its disproportionate effects on small- and medium-sized enterprises, which
arewidely considered tobe less able than largerfirms to absorb the costs associated
with regulation (Lancaster et al., 2003). On closer inspection though, the true
picture is likely to be more complex. In-depth analyses of business survey data,
for example, indicate that reported business perceptions of regulatory effectsmay
exaggerate real business burdens as a result of business actors’misunderstandings
of the actual costs and requirements of regulation, idiosyncrasies in survey
design,1 and the inability of some respondents to think beyond immediate
compliance costs and recognise longer term savings and business opportunities
created by regulation (Allinson et al., 2006; Kitching, 2006; Kitching et al., 2015).
In the event though, these epistemological andmethodological nuances did little
to alter the convictions of those on either side of the debate, whichwas dominated
by the political fetish for large, eye-catching numbers. In evidence to the Treasury
Committee inquiry into the costs of EU membership, for example, Vote Leave
Campaign Director, Dominic Cummings, drew on estimates produced by the
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think tank,OpenEurope (OE), to claim that EU regulations cost theUKeconomy
£33.3 billion per annum (Cummings, 2016). Cummings’ use of OE’s study did
not entirely escape Parliamentary ire. However, the Treasury Committee only
performed a cursory analysis of the underlying basis of OE’s estimates of costs
and benefits and whether they could serve as a reasonable guide to the societal
impacts of EU-derived regulation (Treasury Committee, 2016).
This failure to systematically scrutiniseOE’s data is typical of how aggregated
estimates of the social costs and benefits of regulation are processed in the public
domain.OEhadarrived at its estimates by summatingfigures contained in impact
assessments by UK government departments of the ‘100most burdensome’ EU-
derived regulations (Swidlicki, 2015). The methodology behind OE’s calculation
was not outlined in the briefing publicising its findings (Swidlicki, 2015), but
appears to follow the approach of earlier OE studies estimating the costs of
EU regulations between 1998 and 2009 (Gaskell and Persson, 2010; Persson
et al., 2009). These included administrative costs (costs attendant on producing
information or complying with administrative functions, such as record-keeping
or invoicing, required by regulation) and policy costs (costs incurred through
meeting the aims of regulations) (Gaskell and Persson, 2010), but excluded
items such as government expenditure and the ‘knock-on effects on the wider
economy’ (Gaskell and Persson, 2010; Persson et al., 2009). OE’s methodology
broadly replicates the approach taken by business associations (Ambler et al.,
2010) and other think tanks (Milne, 2004) in similar analyses which, over time,
have subtly set the assumptions of debates on EU regulation: a consequence
of being taken at face value in news commentary and reports (Holehouse,
2015), cited uncritically in formal policy analyses (Anon, HMGovernment, 2013,
2016), and used as the basis of calculations of the costs of EU membership
by academics, business associations, political parties, and professional research
consultants (Confederation of British Industry, 2016b; Congdon, 2016; Minford
et al., 2005; PWC, 2016). However, the question of how far aggregated estimates
of regulatory costs and benefits can be reasonably relied on, or whether focusing
on business administrative and policy costs represents the most useful way of
evaluating the social value of regulation, remains. This paper examines these
questions, focusing on OE’s analysis, which represents the most widely cited,
and arguably most influential, estimate of the impact of EU regulation by the
Leave Campaign (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2016). Specifically,
we review published studies examining the accuracy of cost-benefit projections
in impact assessments, and explore three key issues relevant to the accuracy and
representation of estimates in a sample of labour-related impact assessments in
OE’s analysis: uncertainties and assumptions in cost estimates; the explanatory
value of OE’s focus on administrative and policy costs; under-reporting of
business and non-business benefits. We conclude with some brief observations
about what aggregated cost-benefit estimates of EU-derived regulations can tell
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us about the economisation of public policymaking and the political economy
of policy-relevant knowledge in the UK.
Methods
We undertook two types of analysis. First, to explore the general reliability, and
potential biases, of cost projections in impact assessments, we conducted a desk-
based review of studies comparing ex ante (before the event) estimates in impact
assessments with independently conducted ex post (realised) evaluations. The
database Web of Knowledge was initially searched for studies evaluating the
accuracy of impact assessment cost estimates using a combination of search
strings. Identical search strings were used in the internet search engine Google
to identify grey literature. Additional studies were then identified by searching
for studies (using Google Scholar) citing those identified through these initial
searches. All searches were conducted between November and December 2016.
Articles published prior to 2000, not written in English, and reproducing results
from earlier dated studies in the sample were excluded from the analysis. In
total, we identified 14 studies that met the inclusion criteria (see Table 1 in the
supplementary materials).
Second, we examined a sample of final impact assessments of labour-
related regulations in OE’s analysis (n=10) (Tables 2 and 3 in the supplementary
materials) to explore: the incidence and range of information uncertainties and
assumptions therein (to illustrate their underlying value as a source of data
for assessing administrative and policy costs of regulation); their reliance on
business data (a potential source of overestimated costs); the estimated net
cost of policy proposals in OE’s sample (which provides a more comprehensive
assessment of the costs of EU-derived regulations to business and their likely
effects on aggregate economy-wide output, growth, and employment); the degree
to which they report andmonetise benefits (in order to explore patterns of under
reporting/quantification of business and non-business benefits of EU-derived
regulation inUK impact assessments). Labour-related regulations inOE’s analysis
(n=18) were identified by reviewing OE’s table of the 100 costliest EU-derived
regulations in force in the UK (Swidlicki, 2015). Final impact assessments for
these regulations were downloaded from the UK Government website between
October and December 2016. We took a part purposive, part random approach
to sampling: selecting all regulations with final impact assessments containing an
estimate of the equivalent net annual cost to business (see further below) (n=3),
and taking a random sample of half of the remainder (n=7). The Regulations
represented the 5th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 33rd, 37th, 57th, 64th, 66th and 86th costliest
regulations in OE’s analysis (see Table 2, column 1 in supplementary materials).
Six were occupational health and safety regulations, two related to restrictions
on working time, and one each were concerned with equal treatment at work
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TABLE 1. Summary of Selected Cost and Benefit-Related Data from Labour-Related Final Impact Assessments
Reported Reported
cost benefit in EANCB Verification of Summary of
in OE’s OE’s (£m, price Reliance on business reported Summary of Summary of
analysis analysis base business estimates & uncertainties non-reported non-monetised
Regulation (£m, 2014) (£m, 2014) year 2009) information information and assumptions benefits benefits
The Agency Workers
Regulations 2010
2,210 1,574 n/a Minimal Not relevant Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/information
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government
Moderate non-
monetisation
of benefits
The Road Transport
(Working Time)
Regulations 2005
625 101 n/a Moderate Some evidence of
verification,
and partial
rejection
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/information
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government.
Significant non-
monetisation
of benefits
The Road Transport
(Working Time)
(Amendment)
Regulations 2012)
0 Minimal Not relevant Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/ information
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government.
Significant non-
monetisation
of benefits
use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000526
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. A
ston U
niversity, on 22 A
ug 2017 at 11:24:51, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of
6
g
a
r
y
f
o
o
k
s
a
n
d
t
o
m
m
il
l
s
TABLE 1. Continued.
Reported Reported
cost benefit in EANCB Verification of Summary of
in OE’s OE’s (£m, price Reliance on business reported Summary of Summary of
analysis analysis base business estimates & uncertainties non-reported non-monetised
Regulation (£m, 2014) (£m, 2014) year 2009) information information and assumptions benefits benefits
The Control of
Vibration at Work
Regulations 2005
441 263 n/a Moderate No evidence of
verification
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/information
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government
Significant non-
monetisation
of benefits.
The Working Time
(Amendment)
Regulations 2002
308 0 n/a Minimal Not relevant Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/data
Systematic
reporting of
benefits for
workers;
moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
employers, and
government.
Comprehensive
non-
monetisation
of benefits
The Control of Noise
at Work
Regulations 2005
78 10 n/a Limited No evidence of
verification
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/data
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government
Significant non-
monetisation
of benefits
use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000526
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. A
ston U
niversity, on 22 A
ug 2017 at 11:24:51, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of
p
o
l
it
ic
a
l
l
y
c
o
n
v
e
n
ie
n
t
f
a
c
t
s
a
b
o
u
t
e
u
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
io
n
7
TABLE 1. Continued.
Reported Reported
cost benefit in EANCB Verification of Summary of
in OE’s OE’s (£m, price Reliance on business reported Summary of Summary of
analysis analysis base business estimates & uncertainties non-reported non-monetised
Regulation (£m, 2014) (£m, 2014) year 2009) information information and assumptions benefits benefits
The Work at Height
Regulations 2005
61 64 n/a Significant No evidence of
verification
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/data
Systematic
reporting of
benefits for
workers,
moderate
reporting for
employers and
government
Moderate non-
monetisation
of benefits
The Control of
Asbestos
Regulations 2012
23 0 22 Significant No evidence of
verification,
but partial
rejection
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain and absent
evidence/ data
Moderate
non-reporting
of benefits to
workers,
employers, and
government
Systematic non-
monetisation
of benefits6
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TABLE 1. Continued.
Reported Reported
cost benefit in EANCB Verification of Summary of
in OE’s OE’s (£m, price Reliance on business reported Summary of Summary of
analysis analysis base business estimates & uncertainties non-reported non-monetised
Regulation (£m, 2014) (£m, 2014) year 2009) information information and assumptions benefits benefits
The Control of
Substances
Hazardous to
Health
(Amendment)
Regulations 2004
12 45 n/a Moderate No evidence of
verification,
but partial
rejection
Limited material
cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain
evidence/data
Systematic
reporting of
benefits for
workers,
moderate
reporting for
employers and
government
Significant non-
monetisation
of benefits
Construction
(Design and
Management)
(CDM)
Regulations 2015
10 27 −12.4 Significant No evidence of
verification
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain evidence/
data
Systematic
reporting of
benefits for
employers and
workers
Systematic
monetisation
of benefits
The Transnational
Information and
Consultation of
Employees
(Amendment)
Regulations 2010
6 0 n/a Significant No evidence of
verification
Material cost-relevant
assumptions based on
uncertain &
incomplete evidence/
data
Systematic
reporting of
benefits for
employers and
workers
Comprehensive
non-
monetisation
of benefits
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and worker consultation. In all, 11 impact assessments were reviewed (reflecting
the fact that OE combined costs for the 2005 and 2012 Road Transport (Working
Time) Regulations) (Table 2 in supplementary materials). Monetised estimated
benefits were zero in respect of four. For the remainder, monetised estimated
costs were greater than benefits in four, and less in three. The impact assessments
were thematically analysed using the techniques of thematic analysis outlined by
Guest et al. (Guest et al., 2012): conceptual coding (using Nvivo software), theme
development, systematic conceptual comparison, attention to divergent data, and
conceptual explanatory conclusions. Coding was inductive and emergent and
informed by the literature comparing ex ante estimates in impact assessments
with ex post evaluations.2 Relevant extracts from the assessments are outlined in
Table 3 in the supplementary materials and summarised in Table 1 above.
Business (administrative and policy) costs: nescience and information
asymmetries.
The collective lack of curiosity about the provenance of aggregate estimates
of regulatory costs to some extent reflects deeply ingrained cultural assumptions
about the needs and interests of business within contemporary market
societies. Regulation is now primarily thought of in terms of business costs
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2014), rather than something
that imparts social benefits, which reflects the efforts of business organisations
to link regulatory costs to declining competitiveness and productivity (Select
Committee on Economic Affairs, 2004). However, it also reflects the authority
that impact assessments now command in public administration. Impact
assesssments are essentially evidence-based evaluations of the economic, social,
and environmental effects of public policy (Radaelli, 2009). Government
departments are required to consider the impact of new or amended policies
and regulations to ensure that regulatory costs are kept to a minimum and
use impact assessments to both challenge the need for government intervention
and to identify the most cost-effective policy and method of implementation.
As a result of the establishment of new administrative bodies and procedures,
impact assessments can now be used to obstruct the progression of policy
proposals through the political process, which reinforces their status as valid
and robust statements of the relative costs and benefits of public policy (Lie et al.,
forthcoming).
OE sought to exploit this status in an earlier iteration of its analysis which
it described as ‘an attempt to provide hard, quantified evidence’ on the effect
of regulation on the UK economy (Gaskell and Persson, 2010). However, this
claim neglects the fact that estimated costs and benefits in impact assessments
are widely recognised as unreliable amongst policy actors. In 2005, the US Office
of Management and Budget, which has responsibility for reviewing regulatory
proposals by executive agencies, reported that ‘an ex ante estimate is no more
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than an informed guess’ and, like other forms of prospective modelling, ‘may
or may not prove to be accurate, once real-world experience with the rule is
accumulated and analysed’ (Office of Management and Budget, 2005). The
unreliability of estimates is to be expected given the inherent uncertainties
in predicting future behaviour and anticipating how firms will respond to
policies in fast-moving commercial contexts, particularly those characterised
by technological change (Harrington et al., 2000). It also reflects difficulties in
obtaining reliable data. Many of the estimates in our sample relied heavily on
assumptionsbasedoneitherweakor inconsistentdata.Departments encountered
considerable difficulties in sourcing precise information covering even the most
basic issues, such as the number of businesses or workers likely to be covered
by regulations (see generally Table 3, column 2 in supplementary materials). In
some cases, assumptions appear to bemade with reference to no data at all. In the
consultation to The Road Transport (Working Time) Regulations 2005 (Table 2
in supplementary materials), for example, just under half of employers claimed
that new vehicles would be required once the regulations took effect. Although
the impact assessment noted that this might be ‘a little pessimistic’, and there was
no further evidence of either the number or length of time additional vehicles
would be required, it provided an ‘illustrative’ cost, assuming an extra 12,600
vehicles would be required, each leased for six months at £500 per month (Table
3, column 3 in supplementary materials under effect on estimates). In the absence
of bias, these uncertainties would have little bearing on the validity of studies
which seek to aggregate estimated costs and benefits: overestimates would occur
as often as underestimates and effectively cancel one another out. In practice,
though, the balance of evidence suggests that estimates exhibit systematic biases
overestimating future costs.
Existing studies typically evaluate the accuracy of impact assessment
estimates by comparing ex ante estimates in impact assessments with
independently conducted ex post assessments. The evidence is relatively limited,
differs in approaches taken to estimating costs (Kopits et al., 2014), and
may also be explained partly by biases in sampling (Table 1, Column 4, in
supplementary materials). Nonetheless, the findings of these studies (Table 1,
Column 4 in supplementary materials) suggest that ex ante estimates of the
costs to business often exceed ex post estimates by a considerable margin,
and that this tendency is consistent across policy domains, different types of
policy instruments, and jurisdictions. The reasons underlying this phenomenon
are likely to vary according to policy area and design (Harrington et al.,
2000), and jurisdiction (McGarity and Ruttenberg, 2002). Evaluations of impact
assessments of environmental policy, where the phenomenon has been studied
in greatest depth, highlight a number of recurring causes such as the failure to
anticipate incomplete implementation and compliance (Bailey et al., 2002; IVM
and Ecologic, 2005; MacLeod et al., 2006) and differences in (and potentially
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erroneous) assumptions between ex post and ex ante assessments (IVM and
Ecologic, 2005;MacLeod et al., 2006). Interestingly, they alsoneglect orunderstate
the potential for business to innovate, learn and adapt in response to regulation
(Hammitt, 2000; Harrington et al., 2000; Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2002;
IVM and Ecologic, 2005; MacLeod et al., 2006), despite this being a fairly
well-established phenomenon in the economics literature (Ambec et al., 2013;
Bra¨nnlund and Lundgren, 2009).
Another potential reason, albeit one that is difficult tomeasure, concerns the
existence of information asymmetries between regulated businesses and policy
actors (Harrington et al., 2000; MacLeod et al., 2006; Morgenstern et al., 2001).
In assessing the potential economic impact of policy decisions, policymakers
are often imperfectly informed about the potential economic impacts of policy
decisions and are dependent on information frompotentially affected businesses,
which typically know more about the costs and alternatives for meeting policy
decisions (Hammitt, 2000) and represent a low-cost way of obtaining this data
(Bernhagen, 2007). In the UK, projected regulatory costs in impact assessments
have therefore relied heavily on business estimates (National Audit Office, 2001):
a practice indirectly encouraged by official impact assessment guidance (HM
Treasury, 2011) and consistent with our sample (Table 1 and Table 3, column 3, in
supplementarymaterials).However, relying onbusiness estimates as ameasure of
actual costs assumes that businesses know the precise impacts of policy proposals.
Firms, after all, may only discover cost-saving measures once they are required to
comply with regulations (Harrington et al., 2000). It also assumes that businesses
can be relied on to provide accurate information on these impacts, despite having
amaterial interest in the outcome of policy proposals and an incentive to provide
estimates at the high end of the range (Bernhagen, 2007). The evidence suggests
that both assumptions are questionable.
In our sample, businesses were often unable to provide even the most basic
information (see, for example, Table 3, columns 2 and 3 in supplementary
materials for the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees
(Amendment Regulations) 2010 and The Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012
undermaterial cost-relevant assumptions and summary of business views). Business
information and estimates (where reported) also tended to be equivocal or
were produced using opaque or questionable methods (see, for example, Table
2, column 3 in supplementary materials for The Road Transport (Working
Time) Regulations 2005 and The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
(Amendment) Regulations 2004 under effect on estimates).
In addition, there is now strong evidence suggesting that businesses often
act strategically in policy conflicts by overestimating policy-related costs (Bailey
et al., 2002; International Chemical Secretariat, 2015; McGarity and Ruttenberg,
2002; Stockholm Environment Institute, 1999). Businesses may, for example,
purposefully exaggerate expenditures and only calculate costs formore expensive
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options,whilst trialling less expensiveoptionsonce thepolicyhasbeen introduced
(Hammitt, 2000).Theymayalso include costs ofupgrading additional equipment
and processes introduced alongside changes specifically required by regulation
(Heinzerling andAckerman, 2002). Even themost scrupulousbusinesses are likely
to provide estimates in the higher range in order, quite reasonably, to minimise
the potentially serious commercial risks of under-costing (Ecotec and GHK
Quality Strategy, 2002). There is good evidence to suggest that this phenomenon
extends to impact assessments (Hammitt, 2000; MacLeod et al., 2006). Whether
it represents a systematic problem in UK impact assessments remains unclear,
partly because of the very information asymmetries that make the practice
possible (but see The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (Amendment)
Regulations 2004, Table 3, column 2 in supplementary materials, under effect on
estimates). Nonetheless, the conditions exist for impact assessments to be unduly
influenced by business overestimation of costs. In our sample, business estimates
were typically higher than those made by officials. Information originating
from business relevant to key assumptions also served to increase estimated
costs between pre- and post-consultation impact assessments (Table 3, column
3, in supplementary materials under effect on estimates). This information was
not invariably incorporated into final impact assessment estimates: officials
sometimes rejected information or accepted business claims in principle, but
adjusted them downwards where other, reliable, evidence suggested this was
reasonable (see, for example Table 3, columns 2 and 3 in supplementarymaterials
for The Road Transport (Working Time) Regulations 2005 under material cost-
relevant assumptions and effect on estimates). However, it was more common for
officials to accept business information at face value (Table 1 and Table 3, column
3 under effect on estimates), which affords little disincentive for overestimation
and provides an enabling context for inflated cost estimates in final impact
assessments.
There are, as such, uncertainties involved in working out whether, and to
what extent, cost estimates are inflated in EU-derived regulation (Simpson,
2014). These uncertainties are compounded by the existence of downward
biases in cost estimates. Indirect and difficult-to-measure categories (such as
diverted management attention and innovations not made because of the
time and resources devoted to complying with regulations), for instance,
may be excluded.3 In practice, however, these difficult-to-measure items are
usually of greater relevance to estimates of indirect business costs rather than
administrative and policy costs: the extent to which impact assessments fail
to include them, as such, is unlikely to significantly affect OE’s cost estimates.
The key point, though, is that, on balance, factors producing upward biases
appear to be more significant. Impact assessments, it seems, may be a useful
tool for encouraging policy actors to think about economic, environmental
and social implications of policy proposals but do not necessarily provide
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accurate predictions of actual costs and are not a policy output that can be
usefully deployed in claims-making about the costs to business of government
policies.
Social, environmental, and business benefits
Despite highlighting the costs of regulation tobusiness, aggregated analyseswhich
calculate both sides of the cost-benefit equation commonly find that estimated
benefits (to business, society and the environment) outweigh costs by some
margin. In OE’s analysis, total monetised benefits (£58,579m) outstripped costs
(£33,269m) by over £25,000m (2014 prices) (Swidlicki, 2015). This may go some
way to explaining why OE has taken great pains to emphasise that estimated
benefits of key regulations are ‘vastly over-stated’ (Swidlicki, 2015) and that ‘with
more than half of the regulations there [are] no clear benefits’ (Anon, 2016). This
last observation reflects the fact that, on a case-by-case basis, reportedmonetised
costs for regulations in OE’s analysis exceed reported benefits by 57 to 39 (in
four cases the reported sums were the same) and that in 26 cases the reported
monetisedbenefitswere zero. But towhat extent should thismethodof presenting
benefits be accepted at face value?
One important point to make, which is not often apparent when the
costs and benefits of regulation are compared, is that devaluing regulatory
benefits is easier to achieve where regulation is discussed as an abstraction and
benefits are approached purely in economic terms. It is much harder where
they are considered with reference to how they improve lives, which can place
an entirely different weight on the social value of government action. To take
one example, the European Commission has estimated that its Directive on
industrial emissions (2010/75/EU4), which aims to reduce industrial emissions
across the EU (European Union, 2010), will, for large combustion plants alone,
lead to an annual reduction of 13,000 premature deaths and 125,000 years
of life lost (European Commission, 2016). This does not, however, strictly
address OE’s objections, which suggest that there are grounds for scepticism
of estimated benefits either because they are inadequate relative to the costs
they impose, or because they exhibit systematic biases, which overestimate their
effects.
One problemwithOE’s presentation ofmonetised benefits is that it collapses
effects ondifferent social groups.This feeds into, andhelps reinforce, the tendency
to cast regulation as a struggle for resources between business (whose needs
must be prioritised over time in market-based economies – see Farnsworth
in this volume), and other, dependent, constituencies, such as workers, the
public, and government (whose interests are typically represented as being of
secondary importance – see below). However, restricting estimates of business
costs to administrative and direct policy costs can represent a misleading way of
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balancing costs and benefits between business and these other groups. In practice,
many benefits that accrue to other groups indirectly benefit business, which
offset monetised administrative and direct policy costs. Occupational health and
safety regulations that reduce worker discomfort, absences, turnover, and early
retirement, for example, increase worker and business productivity, and reduce
business administrative costs associated with absenteeism, recruitment and
retraining (see Table 3, column 4, in supplementary materials under reported and
non-reported benefits (employers)). Equally, regulations that encourage technical
fixes to social problemsmay increase the salesoffirms supplying these services (see
Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials under non-reported benefits). Even
benefits that involve transfer payments from businesses to workers, such as the
AgencyWorkers Regulations 2010 (see Tables 2 and 3, column 4 in supplementary
materials), will benefit business in so far as workers spend (or invest) their
increased take elsewhere in the economy. Almost all the regulations in our sample
provided at least some benefits to business (even though these were not always
costed or reported, see Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials). Over the
last six years, impact assessments have specifically sought to capture some of
these benefits in the form of the equivalent annual net cost to business (EANCB).
The data included in the EANCB is relatively limited, and omits many potential
business benefits (HM Government, 2011). Nonetheless, EANCB calculations
can recast the magnitude of business costs quite significantly. For example,
the EANCB for The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015
suggests a net gain to business of £12.4 million, but in OE’s analysis it represents
an annual cost to business of £10million (Table 1).
On the issue of whether there are systematic biases in estimated benefits the
evidence is not entirely consistent. There is some evidence from the US to suggest
that impact assessments may inflate estimated benefits, because of their tendency
to (erroneously) assume full compliance with regulations (Harrington et al.,
2000). In our sample, officials’ approach to estimating compliance was mixed
(see Table 3, column 2 in supplementary material under assumptions relevant to
the rate of compliance). More to the point though, benefits to workers, business,
and government were routinely overlooked (Table 1 and Table 3, column 4 in
supplementary materials under non-reported benefits). This is consistent with
other evidence, which suggests that UK policy actors place far less emphasis on
ensuring that social and environmental benefits are rigorouslymapped in impact
assessments than they do on business costs. A recent study commissioned by the
Department of Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) of impact assessments
producedby governmentdepartments between 2008 and 2011, for example, found
thatwhile over 80per cent treated economic impactswithmediumor high rigour,
social impacts were treated with low rigour or not at all in 52 per cent of cases (the
corresponding figure for environmental impacts was 50 per cent) (Tinch et al.,
2014).
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UK policymakers’ apparent relative lack of attention to benefits compounds
technical problems inmonetising benefits. Benefits are often complex andmulti-
causal (see, for example, Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials for
The Road Transport (Working Time) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 under
disputed benefits), difficult to measure (see, for example, Table 3, column 4 in
supplementary materials for The Transnational Information and Consultation
of Employees (Amendment) Regulations 2010 under non-monetised benefits
(workers and employers)), long-term and not priced in the market. This
problematises their monetisation (Smith et al., 2010) and may also lead to them
being out of scope of impact assessments where the typical appraisal period is
10 years. The potential effect of this last point on OE’s calculation of benefits is
illustrated by its treatment of benefits associated with The Control of Noise at
Work Regulations 2005 (Table 2 in supplementary materials). OE used figures
presented in the impact assessment for 10 years. However, the impact of noise
on hearing is cumulative and there is a long latency before the effects become
manifest. These factors were reflected in large differences in the estimated health
benefits quantified over ten years (range £72.1m and £72.3m in present, 2005,
net value terms) and forty years (range £1.31bn and £1.39bn, in present, 2005,
net value terms), which were also outlined in the impact assessment. By basing
its calculations on the 10-year estimate, OE reported an annual benefit of £10m
(2014 prices), significantly lower than the £45m (2014 prices) annual benefit that
it would have reported if it had used the 40-year projections as the base for its
estimate (Health and Safety Executive, 2005).
Problems of quantification are exacerbated by a dearth of impact assessment-
ready evidence. This partly reflects the political economy of research on issues
relating to regulation. Historically, for instance, the literature on the economic
impacts of occupational health and safety regulations has focused on compliance
costs for business, rather than other groups (such as workers and their families,
government, and the general public), and has neglected cumulative economic
impacts (such as the effects of work-related accidents and ill health on lost
output – see, for example, The Control of Vibration at Work Regulations 2005,
Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials under non-monetised benefits)
(Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2009). Data concerning the impact
of working conditions on occupational health are also widely understood to
under-report the effects of corporate activity on human health and welfare,
which limits the measurable, and, therefore, monetisable pool of potential
benefits a proposed regulation can deliver (see, for example, Table 3, column
4 for The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (Amendment) Regulations
2004 under non-monetised benefits (workers) and column 2 for The Control of
Vibration atWork Regulations 2005 undermaterial cost-relevant assumptions and
non-monetised benefits (general)). These problems are compounded by the fact
that businesses are potentially an even poorer source of evidence of economic
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benefits than they are for costs. For example, many do not know how much
accidents or work-related illness cost their businesses; a function of limited time
and resources, perceived complexity and an absence of expertise (Haefeli et al.,
2005). In fact, our sample suggests that this phenomenon cuts across different
types of benefits (see generally Table 3, columns 2, 3 and 4 in supplementary
materials) and that, in practice, businesses are just as likely to contest claimed
benefits (see, for example, Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials for
The Road Transport (Working Time) (Amendment) Regulations 2012), than
provide detailed, quantifiable, evidence necessary for their monetisation. The
result is that benefits are rarely fully monetised. The aforementioned DEFRA
study found full quantification and monetary valuation to be a relatively
rare occurrence. Assessments in two-thirds of impact assessments identifying
environmental impacts, and three-quarters identifying social impacts, were
primarily descriptive. Only one in eight systematically quantified environmental
impacts (Tinch et al., 2014). This is consistent with our sample: systematic
monetisation was rare (1 in 11) and, where monetised benefits were reported
as zero, this was primarily due to methodological difficulties attendant on
monetisation, rather than because the regulations concerned were unlikely
to produce any benefits (Table 1 and Table 3, column 4 in supplementary
materials).
Finally, in contrast to costs which can be valued with reference to market
prices, some values, such as social justice, are incapable of measurement, let
alone monetisation (Torriti, 2011). This highlights a more profound problem
concerning the political and disciplinary assumptions that are built into valuing
benefits which can produce some perverse results. Using quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs), for example, devalues the lives of elderly people (who have fewer
QALYs to live) anddisabledpeople (whohave reducedQALYs) (Smith et al., 2010).
Thus, even where the evidence is strong, and methods rigorously applied, it does
not necessarily follow that the final figures fully reflect benefits as understood by
non-economists.
The cost-competitiveness-employment conundrum
The relativelywell-establisheddoubts concerning the validity of costs andbenefits
in impact assessments are arguably sufficient in themselves to dismiss aggregated
monetised analyses as useful epistemological tools for understanding the impact
of EU-derived regulation on the UK economy and society. Nonetheless, their
political appeal remains relatively undimmed. Outwardly, this attraction rests
on a virtuous premise: that, over time, regulation decreases employment as
a result of the permanent pressure it places on business competitiveness and
output (Ambler et al., 2010; Congdon, 2014). As Ambler et al. put it, ‘Transferring
money from wealth creating business to wealth consuming citizens will, sooner
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or later, damage competitiveness and reduce employment’ (Ambler et al.,
2010). The proposed causal mechanisms here are complex and overlapping.
Among other things, regulation is said to raise firm costs, which raises the
costs of product and services, which in turn leads to a reduction in sales and,
inevitably, in employment. Regulation is also said to divert firm resources away
from savings, investment and capital formation, which reduces innovation and
development of new technologies, processes, products, and services that may
increase productivity, lower prices and increase sales. In addition, some authors
have pointed to the uncertainties regulation creates, which is said to have a
depressive effect on new hiring and investment (Coglianese and Carrigan, 2013;
Shapiro and Irons, 2011). These effects can, and do, occur. However, there are
several problems in applying this thinking to regulation as an undifferentiated
phenomenon.Oneobviouspoint is that increased costs donot inevitably decrease
competitiveness. Competitiveness is a relational concept, which involves the
ability of a firm to provide products or services (of comparable quality) more
effectively and efficiently (and at lower costs) than other firms. Estimating the
impact of regulatory costs on competitiveness therefore requires a distinction
to be made between traded industries, where firms in a specific sector sell or
are capable of selling a significant share of their output outside of the regulated
geographical region (the UK and EU in this case), and non-traded industries.
Where regulation applies to non-traded industries, its effect on aggregate firm
competitiveness and, therefore, employment is likely to be less significant. This
is not to say that regulation will have no effect on affected firms in non-traded
industries. Businesses that can more readily absorb costs without raising prices
in the short term (because, for example, they have superior access to capital and
can offset investments by greater economies of scale) will, over time, do better
relative to their competitors. Regulation may also have an effect on inflation by
raising prices in non-traded industries. However, whether these effects occur
and what effect they have on employment are, ultimately, empirical questions
which turn on the precise form of the regulation, the sector it affects, and
how regulated firms respond to their altered regulatory environment (Frontier
Economics, 2012).
A similar point can be made about the effects of regulation on employment
in traded industries. Environmental regulation, for example, can increase
employment in pollution abatement, which offsets jobs losses that may occur
as a result of administrative and policy costs. Regulation can also improve
worker and public health, leading to lower health care costs and increased worker
productivity. It can also increase innovation and, under certain conditions, lead
to improved firm performance: both of which may have a positive impact
on employment (Coglianese et al., 2013). In short, effects of regulation on
employment are highly contextualised and evaluating the impact of regulatory
costs on both firm and economy-wide competitiveness and employment can
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only be meaningfully analysed with reference to specific regulations in specific
circumstances. In fact, one well-received review of studies on the impact of
regulation on employment in the US has found that the net effects have been
close to zero (Coglianese et al., 2013).
Discussion
Aggregate calculations of the cost of EU-derived regulation play an important
role in lending weight to claims of the negative impact of regulation on business
competitiveness and employment in the UK. However, their methodological
weaknesses suggest that their key significancemay reside less in what they can tell
us about the relationship between regulation, business performance, and public
welfare, and more in what they suggest about the interdependencies between the
economisation of public policy, the fungibility of impact assessment data, and
the political market for contemporary policy-relevant knowledge.
Impact assessments represent a key component of government efforts to
embed economic rationality into everyday routines of policymaking (Morgan,
2003). They seek to standardise how government intervention in the economy
should be perceived and evaluated and have become an authoritative basis for
the deliberation of policy: partly because they represent a genuine attempt
to systematise the evaluation of projected effects and place an emphasis on
numerical values, which implies precision, but also because of how they are
governed. Impact assessment methodologies rest on the disciplinary practices
of microeconomics and are policed by new administrative institutions, such
as the Regulatory Policy Committee, which determine which data government
departments should collate, fromwhom, and how they should be interpreted (Lie
et al., forthcoming). This framework has progressively reinforced their status as
trusted measures of policy effects but, at the same time, provides a basis for
their misappropriation by rendering their assumptions, biases, and uncertainties
relatively inaccessible to independent scrutiny. Opacity to summary analysis, in
conjunction with the availability of multiple (and incomplete) numerical values
creates a fungible (and flexible) pool of data for policy reappraisal, which afford
various representations of policy proposals that can be spliced and interpreted in
different ways to suit the political programmes of different constituencies. In this
respect as such, aggregate analyses are as much a measure of desired direction of
political travel, as a statement of the problems of the British economy.
In the present case, this observation derives support from two other issues
that OE failed to consider, which are fundamental to accurately estimating the
proportion of regulatory costs that should be attributed to EU membership
(Springford, 2016). First, some EU regulations originate from international
commitments and obligations, which OE costed into its analysis even though the
UK may have implemented similar measures if it had not been a member of the
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000526
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Aston University, on 22 Aug 2017 at 11:24:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
politically convenient facts about eu regulation 19
EU (PWC, 2016). Second, the UK has gone beyond the minimum requirements
demanded by the EU in respect of several EU Directives in OE’s analysis (PWC,
2016; Sack, 2013), including the Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC), Part
Time Work Directive (1997/81/EC, 1998/23/EC) and Parental Leave Directive
(2010/18/EC). Interestingly, OE had previously raised the issue of gold-plating
in evidence to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ review of the
balance of competencies between the UK and EU on social and employment
policy (HM Government, 2014), but neglected to adjust for this in its analysis
despite the fact that costs resulting from over-compliance do not directly result
from EU law-making.
It is easy to dismiss the multiple weaknesses of OE’s analysis as largely
irrelevant to the big issues facing theUK economy as the country prepares to leave
the EU.But aggregate cost analyses compete for political spacewith other ideas for
boosting productivity and competitiveness which are likely to have amore benign
effect on social inequalities and environmental protection, such as addressing
skills shortages, underinvestment in research and development, overinvestment
in property, and public investment in green technologies. They also help to
drown out the implications of other sources of data, which provide the basis for
alternative accounts of how deregulation may affect competitiveness. European
regulationhas not prevented theUK fromhaving one of themost lightly regulated
economies amongst countries in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). The best available measures suggest that it has the
second least regulatedproductmarkets in theOECD, and employment protection
legislation that is only marginally more restrictive than the US or Canada, less
so than Australia, and far lower than other European countries in the OECD
(Koske et al., 2015; Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development,
2014). Despite this, the political constituency that formed around the Leave
Campaign has continued to extol the economic advantages of the regulatory
flexibility offeredby the referendumresult andhas advocated that the government
individually review all EU-derived legal instruments so that key environmental
and social regulations (such as those associated with the Working Time and
Agency Workers Directives and Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction on Chemicals (Buckle et al., 2015) can be repealed
or radically scaled back.
This conviction in competitive deregulation as the most potent means of
securing future British economic and social prosperity is difficult to fathom
given the evidence outlined above, the UK’s scope for deregulation, its extant
international commitments, the needs of its largest companies to maintain
access to the EU, or econometric analyses, which generally associate the UK’s
membership of the single market with higher growth, increased foreign direct
investment, and higher average incomes (Campos et al., 2014; Bruno et al.,
2016). These factors help to explain the more pragmatic position taken by the
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Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the UK’s most influential business
association, which has consistently stressed that the advantages of access provided
by regulatory equivalence outweigh the costs (Confederation of British Industry,
2016c). Its preferred option involves continued regulatory equivalence in the
short and medium term; a recognition that any competitive advantages from
weaker regulation will potentially be offset by restrictions in market access,
increased costs for firms exporting to the EU, and reduced growth. However,
whether this represents a distinct agenda or simply a difference in priorities
and emphasis, moderated by the specific interests of its membership,5 is a
moot point. The CBI’s position is underpinned by a desire for stability. Over
the longer term, it recognises the value of regulatory divergence where this is
consistent with optimum access to EUmarkets and continued inward investment
(Confederation of British Industry, 2016a, 2016c). To this end, it has advocated
deregulation in areas of EU regulation that the UK has over-implemented (and
so can be streamlined without harming preferential trading with the EU) and
highlighted the importance of the UK resisting implementation of further social
and employment regulation (Confederation of British Industry, 2016c), which
reflects its past opposition to the Temporary Agency Workers Directive and
Working Time Directive (Confederation of British Industry, 2015).
These commonalities point to deeper drivers of domestic regulatory policy,
which help to explain the sometimes uncompromising and under-analysed
claims about EU-derived regulation. At their heart, regulatory debates are
discussions about who should bear the costs and reap the benefits of economic
activity.Many regulations have a redistributive effect, transferring resources from
businesses to workers, the public, government, and future generations. Deeply
held philosophical assumptions about the rights of capital, the appropriate role of
the state inmarket economies, and the primacy of capital accumulation, as much
as evidence, seems to be driving regulatory policy: a political-moral opposition to
public intervention inmarkets and scepticism of the social value of redistributive
politics. The key objection, as Ambler et al. have put it, may simply be that
‘politicians have grabbed regulation as a “free” way to increase social benefits
without the transparency of taxation’ (Ambler et al., 2010).
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0047279417000526
Notes
1 Where open-ended questions are asked in the absence of cues, for example, regulation often
ranks low down the list of self-reported problems (Allinson et al., 2006; Baldock and Blundel,
2014).
2 Detailed coding descriptions available on request from authors.
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3 For contrasting examples see the impact assessment for Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012
which did not account for opportunity costs and the impact assessment and associated
material for the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees (Amendment)
Regulations 2010 andWork atHeightRegulations 2005whereopportunity costswere included
(Tables 2 and 3 in supplementary materials).
4 The 22nd most beneficial and 29th costliest EU-derived regulation in OE’s analysis.
5 The CBI’s membership was largely behind continued membership of the EU. This reflects
three factors: the largely positive (or neutral) effect of EU-derived regulation on earnings ; the
fact that EU-derived regulations largely represent sunk costs for key sectors (Confederation
of British Industry, 2016c); that large firms, in particular, benefit from access to the single
market by virtue of their capacity to exploit economies of scale.
6 See Table 3, column 4 in supplementary materials under disputed benefits.
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